E ective malware detection approaches need not only high accuracy, but also need to be robust to changes in the modus operandi of criminals. In this paper, we propose M , a feature-agnostic system that aims at propagating known malicious reputation of certain les to unknown ones with the goal of detecting malware. M does this by looking at a graph that encapsulates a comprehensive view of how les are downloaded (by which hosts and from which servers) on a global scale. e reputation of les is then propagated across the graph using semi-supervised label propagation with Bayesian con dence. We show that M is able to reach high accuracy (0.94 G-mean on average) over a 10-day dataset of 200 million download events. We also demonstrate that M 's detection capabilities do not signi cantly degrade over time, by testing our system on a 30-day dataset of 660 million download events collected six months a er the system was tuned and validated. M still maintains a similar accuracy a er this period of time.
INTRODUCTION
e malware ecosystem is constantly evolving, with cybercriminals both devising new ways to monetize their malicious so ware (e.g., ransomware [14] ) and devising more e cient techniques to deliver malicious payloads to victim computers (e.g., exploit kits [8] or payper-install services [5] , as well as developing techniques that make their operations stealthier and more resilient -e.g., Fast Flux [9] or Domain Generation Algorithms (DGA) [3] .
Traditionally, malware detection is based on static [18, 31] or dynamic [6, 15] analysis. Such techniques, however are prone to evasion [12] and require a considerable amount of computational resources to carry out their inspections. More recently, the security research community has proposed approaches that are content-agnostic, performing detection without looking at the malware sample itself. Some of these techniques detect malware by looking at the characteristics of malware delivery infrastructures [5, 27, 30, 35] . Others identify topological relations among hosts and IP addresses in the hosting infrastructure used by cybercriminals [11, 20, 41] , crawl potential malicious hosting sites in a proactive fashion [10, 32] , analyze le co-occurrence relationships Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for pro t or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the rst page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permi ed. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior speci c permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. on infected computers [23, 36] , or get insights from downloaderpayload relationships of les on a host [19] .
e problem with most of these content-agnostic approaches is that they use features that are based on common characteristics of malware delivery infrastructures, but these characteristics can change over time due to normal evolution or a empts to evade detection. For example, if certain characteristics relating to network topology or payload dropping change signi cantly, the classi ers must be retrained to maintain acceptable detection rates.
More importantly, the security community is now able to collect a very large amount of information at an unprecedented scale, e.g., amassing hundreds of millions of malware samples distributed globally on a daily basis. But how to e ciently identify malware from such large datasets remains a challenge. To address this Big Data challenge, we propose a solution that is principled, in the sense that it does not rely on a speci c modus operandi of malware operators or on speci c features of malware delivery networks. Instead of trying to understand whether a network delivery infrastructure is malicious, or identify les as malware from their characteristics or local view of le downloads, we leverage the known reputation of a small number of malicious and benign les, and propagate this information to other les that shared some part of the delivery infrastructure with them, with the goal of agging them as benign or malicious. Our system, called M , rst builds a global graph of le delivery, which we call download graph. Such a graph embodies a comprehensive view of how les are downloaded (by which hosts and from which servers and which les they drop) on a global scale. M is agnostic to the type of protocol used to host the les, to the type of the les themselves, to the speci c techniques used by malware operators to avoid detection (such as Fast-Flux and DGA) and is therefore generic and resilient to evasion. In the next step, M performs semi-supervised label propagation with Bayesian con dence to propagate the reputation of known malicious les to unknown ones, allowing us to signi cantly and e ciently grow our knowledge of malware samples.
A key advantage of M is that it requires limited ground truth to operate, and it can grow the initial knowledge of malware signi cantly with a guaranteed linear computational complexity, which is a desirable characteristic in dealing with extremely largescale datasets. We validate M on a dataset of 200 million download events collected by Symantec over a period of ten days. We show that our system is able to reach high accuracy (0.94 Gmean on average) and grow our knowledge of malicious samples up to 11 times, requiring a limited number of malware ground truth samples for seeding. An additional desirable property for a malware detection system is to keep their accuracy for long periods of time. is is a particularly important requirement, given the pace at which malware operations evolve. To test whether M is able to retain similar accuracy over time, we test our system on a 30-day dataset of 660 million download events that was collected by Symantec six months a er the system was tuned. We show that M is still e ective even a er this long time, without any need for re-tuning.
Our analysis highlights idiosyncrasies of malware delivery on the Internet that generate limited but systematic false positives when running label propagation approaches such as M . For instance, it is common to have malware delivered through legitimate Content Delivery Networks (CDNs), and this can cause benign les to be tainted and mistakenly considered as malicious. Similarly, we observe that malicious les, and in particular potentially unwanted programs (PUPs [17]), have the tendency to download legitimate libraries (DLLs) as additional components. e bad reputation of the PUPs can then be propagated to these other les by M . We provide detailed examples of these phenomena, and we propose a simple whitelist approach to reduce M 's false detections. We show that these systematic false positives do not change signi cantly over time, and a whitelist compiled six month before deployment is e ective in signi cantly reducing the false detection rate of M . In summary, this paper makes the following contributions:
• We propose M , a system based on semi-supervised Bayesian label propagation to propagate the reputation of known les across a download graph that depicts le delivery networks (both legitimate and malicious). e model is designed to be scalable and e cient.
• We validate M on a dataset of 200 million downloads collected in the wild. We show that M does not need carefully cra ed seeds to catch malicious les, and a limited set of known malicious les is enough to seed a system with limited false positives.
• We show that M does not require frequent retuning by testing it on a dataset of 660 million downloads collected six months a er the system was tuned. We demonstrate that a simple whitelisting of les is enough to dramatically reduce the false positives reported by M . To illustrate the complexity of keeping track of malware samples across di erent distribution infrastructures, consider the real world example in Figure 1 . Each graph is built by looking at the ere are two servers delivering malware, each with a distinct IP address as well as a separate domain (absoluterejuven.com and amalgamatedcoatings.com). Each malicious server drops two di erent malicious les over its lifetime, to a di erent victim computer each. In particular, the malicious le identi ed by the SHA2 value 4B914... is dropped by both servers. One solution to ag these les as malware is to blacklist the malicious hosts dropping them, and consequently consider as malware any executable dropped by those hosts. A problem with this technique is that blacklists typically have coverage problems [26, 29] , and if only one of the two hosts ended up in the blacklist then there would be a malware sample that would escape detection (either 7379C... or 9DBD9...). Another option is to blacklist les as they are observed, for example by running them in a sandbox and agging anomalous behavior [39] . e problem with this type of techniques is that malware authors are actively trying to evade sandbox systems, and for this reason these approaches have limited coverage too. If a sandbox system was able to detect only the malware sample identi ed by 4B914... as malicious, then the other two would escape detection.
BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
To mitigate the aforementioned limitations, previous work focused on studying le dropping relationships a er the malicious les are downloaded on victim computers [13, 19] . ese approaches build local le dropping graphs extracted from endpoints (similar to Figure 1 ), extract features from these local graphs, and leverage machine learning algorithms to detect malicious droppers. While these approaches are e ective in detecting droppers (i.e., malware samples that download additional components, for example as part of pay-per-install schemes), they do not provide a global view of the malware delivery ecosystem, and therefore their detection is also limited. For example, it is not guaranteed that any of the two aforementioned systems would be able to ag the les 7379C... on machine 1 and 4B914... on machine 2 as malware. is could happen because the localized view leveraged by these systems requires local graphs to be complex to guarantee an e ective detection (e.g., to be part of a dropper operation in [19] or to have multiple infections on the same machine in [13]), or because the features relating to malware delivery infrastructures (e.g., the number of unique domains [19] ) have changed since the time the detection systems were trained, and the detection e ciency of the systems decreased signi cantly since then.
As we said, in this paper we propose to approach the problem of detecting malware in a principled way, by looking at the end-toend le distribution from a global perspective instead of focusing on local views or relying on speci c features of malware delivery networks (as previous systems did [11, 27] ). In fact, the only requirement for M is for malicious hosts to drop a multitude of malicious les, possibly dropped by other servers too. As these requirements are needed by the malware delivery process to be e ective, they are not likely to change. Figure 2 shows an example of the download graph built by M , obtained by merging the localized information from Figure 1 . As it can be seen, this graph includes the information that the malicious le identi ed by 4B914... is downloaded by two separate servers. anks to this global view, we can leverage structural information to detect malware when we only know that some of the les are malicious -as we will see in Section 3, we do this by probabilistically propagating labels across the download graph. For example, if node 1 in Figure 2 was initially agged as malicious, node 2 and node 3 could be agged as well since the boundary between hosts and machines no longer exists in this representation, and the evidence of maliciousness could be propagated along the graph. Ideally, a very limited initial knowledge of malicious samples could be enough to have this reputation propagated across the graph and to identify a large number of unknown malicious les. Problem statement. Despite of its straightforwardness, the global download graph and the label propagation that we propose bring along several interesting issues regarding their applicability to the real world, especially in the Big Data context. First of all, legitimate content delivery network infrastructures (e.g., Amazon Web Services, Akamai) have been substantially used to host large amounts of malware alongside benign so ware, and therefore both benign so ware and malware are served through them [38] . At the same time, vulnerable websites (typically serving benign les) could also be compromised by cybercriminals to host malware. Moreover, a considerable amount of les could not be analyzed in a timely manner and thus have unknown reputation at the time of check (i.e., we could not con rm that a le is benign or malicious). Inevitably this global download graph is a mixture of benign les, malware, PUPs, and les with unknown status together with their hosting infrastructures. On that account, our major goal is to design a scalable graph inference model to reliably detect malicious les and validate this approach via a large-scale analysis on real-world data.
is approach complements existing malware detection systems as it o ers insights on how various les are hosted and distributed to end-hosts. Our second goal is to develop an approach that can be e ective over a long period of time, despite the quick changes that the malware delivery ecosystem understakes. Finally, our third goal is to gain insights into current malware delivery schemes, which can help our community develop be er mitigation techniques.
METHODOLOGY
In this section, we start by explaining how M builds download graphs. We then describe the label propagation with Bayesian con dence graph inference model used by M , giving a real world example of how it works. Finally, we provide a theoretical analysis of its scalability in dealing with large scale datasets. 
Building Download Graph
M builds download graphs to perform its label propagation operation. We de ne the download graph
in which V is a set of heterogeneous nodes that represent the following entities: IP addresses, Fully-quali ed domain names (FQDNs), URLs, and les. It is important to note that, although the nodes in this graph have a very di erent nature, some being related to hosts and some others to les, M treats them in the same way, as the le reputation is propagated across them without making a distinction on their types. is keeps our model general and makes it independent to speci c characteristics of malware delivery networks. E is a set of edges that represent the relationships among these nodes. As we will explain later, we consider nodes as connected if they appeared in the same download event.
A is the symmetric adjacent matrix of the graph G: A i, j = 1 if x i and x j are linked, otherwise A i, j = 0. An example of download graph is shown in Figure 3 . As it can be seen, the model captures both le dropping relationships and the le distribution network as discussed in Section 2.
To build the download graph, M takes as input download events. We de ne a download event as a tuple
where I is the IP address that the le was downloaded from, D is its FQDN, U f is the full URL of the download (a er removing the URL parameters), while F f is the le identi ed by its SHA2. We then have information on the le that initiated the download event. is le can be a malware sample dropping other malware, as part of a payper-install scheme [5] or a legitimate program used to download les, such as a web browser. As we will explain in Section 4, we remove information on popular web browsers and le archivers from our datasets, to avoid to have unrelated les connected in the download graph. F p indicates the SHA2 of this parent le, while U p indicates the URL that this le was downloaded from. Note that both these values are not necessarily present in a download event.
In fact, the information where a parent le was downloaded might not be available. Finally, we include a series of URLs U i1 , ...U ik , which are the URLs involved in the HTTP redirection chain that terminates with the nal download URL U f . As previous research showed [35] malware operators are commonly using redirection chains to make their infrastructures resilient and avoid detection.
ese URLs are not always present in a download event, because not all downloads take advantage of any redirection. M collects download events over an observation period (as we show in Section 5.4, we experiment with variable period lengths, from one hour to one day), and then builds the download graph associated to this observation period. To build the graph, the following steps are taken for each download event d:
• For each element d e in the tuple d, we check if d e already has a node in the graph, if it does not, we create a new node identi ed by the node's identi er and add it to the set of nodes V . We use the full IP address and the FQDN as identi ers for IP addresses and domain nodes respectively, the full URL without parameters for URL nodes, and the SHA2 hash for le nodes.
• If there is no edge existing yet between any two elements d e 1 and d e 2 in d, we create one and add it to the set of edges E.
Finally, we populate the |V | × |V | matrix A, se ing A i, j as 1 if there is an edge between those two nodes, and to 0 otherwise. is matrix will be used by the label propagation algorithm described in the next section.
Label Propagation with Bayesian
Con dence
In this section we outline the theoretical foundation of M to detect malware reliably over the download graph. To describe the malware detection problems in formal terms, we introduce the notions used in this section rst, then formally present the Bayesian label propagation algorithm employed by M . Note that our proposed Bayesian label propagation is a semi-supervised algorithm and calculates posterior probability of a node's missing labels based on graph structure. It is di erent from belief propagation, which is a sum-product message passing algorithm and estimates marginal distribution of each variable through the factor graph based presentation of a given Bayesian network. Notation. Let x i represent an element d e in d (see Section 3.1), and
, where Y U denotes the underlying true class labels of the unlabeled data. In addition, X = {x 1 , x 2 , ...x l +u } is used to denote the combination of both labeled and unlabeled data. Bayesian Label propagation. Label propagation [42] , as a transductive semi-supervised learning algorithm, is designed to estimate Y U from X and the given Y L by propagating label information from labeled data samples to unlabeled ones. It has shown that graphbased propagation can be very e ective at nding the best label distribution across nodes [42] . However, most nodes in a real world download graph tend to have few neighbors, and thus, a small amount of evidence. It is important for us to provide a con dence level to the inference results. In our work, the malware detection algorithm used by M is designed by inheriting the spirit of label propagation and incorporating the technique of Bayesian inference [40] . We use the graph de nition G = (V , E, A) presented in Section 3.1 for download graphs, where V represents les, URLs, FQDN and IP nodes, the edge set E represents the relationships among these nodes, and A is the symmetric adjacent matrix of the graph G: A i, j = 1 if x i and x j are linked, otherwise A i, j = 0.
We assume the label (benign or malicious) of each node in the graph as a random categorical variable. e label is 1 or 0, corresponding to the malicious or benign class. What we target is to infer the probability of each node to be malicious as P ( i = 1|θ ) = θ , where θ is the parameter of the distribution. Changing the value of θ changes the likelihood of the corresponding nodes belonging to the malicious group. Following the neighborhood smoothness hypothesis of label propagation, we assume the graph nodes inside the same neighborhood share the same θ value. e binomial likelihood of labels inside the neighborhood is given as follows:
whereÑ i denotes the all graph nodes in the neighborhood of node i. n i = j ∈Ñ i j . For computational convenience, we use the conjugate prior of the binomial distribution, a.k.a Dirichlet distribution as the prior probability over θ ,
, where α 1 and α 2 are the parameters of Dirichlet prior. e posterior distribution of θ given the labels of the nodes inside the same neighborhood is formulated as:
In a further step, we can write the posterior predictive distribution of i :
To derive the formulation of the predictive distribution, we follow the theorem that the predictive distribution P ( k |α k ,Ñ i ) = E(θ |Ñ i , α k ) and we assume k ={1,2} α k = 1 and Ñ i is the number of neighbors of the node i in the graph. By relaxing the de nition of n i and replacing the discrete labels of the neighboring nodes with continuous posterior probability of node labels P ( i = 1|Ñ i , α 1 ), we can further derive a recursive estimation of the con dence of node labeling in the following equation:
where N is the number of nodes in the graph and A is the adjacency matrix. We use f i to denote the posterior labeling probability P ( i = 1|Ñ i , α 1 ). With a simple linear algebra calculation, the recursive calculation of labeling posterior probability for each unlabeled node in the download graph can be formulated in a matrix form:
Assuming we have u unlabeled nodes, 1 is u dimensional column vector with each entry as 1. F is a vector of f i for all nodes including both labeled and unlabeled, and F U is a vector of f i for u unlabeled nodes. A U is formed by aggregating the u rows of A corresponding to unlabeled nodes. I is a u-by-u identify matrix, and D U is a u-by-u diagonal matrix, where the k-th element in diagonal is the sum of all values in the k-th row of A U . An example of how Marmite infers probabilistic node labels in a small real-world download graph is shown in Section 3.3.
Marmite: Inference Example
In this section, we demonstrate how M infers probabilistic node labels in a small real-world download graph.
e label f i is a probabilistic value as de ned in Eq (6) and f i ∈ [0, 1] (see Section 3.2 for details). In short, the closer f i to 1, the more likely a le is malicious; the closer f i to 0, the more likely a le is benign. Initially le 4.exe with SHA2 96D26... and le svchos.exe with SHA2 DB000... are identi ed as malicious les (respectively Zusy and a trojan). We label them accordingly using 1 as their probability of being malware. Another le 4.exe with SHA2 CB866... is labeled with 0 (i.e., a known benign le). M uses Eq (6) to recursively update each node's probabilistic label and the results are shown in Figure 4 . As we can observe, le AFFGSDGWIJGWEOG.exe with SHA2 18A2F... is agged as malicious with high probabilistic con dence score 0.969 as all its neighbors (i.e., svchos.exe in this case) are malicious.
is follows the neighborhood smoothness hypothesis of label propagation (see Section 3.2). e other nodes' probabilistic node labels (between 0.6 and 0.7) were partially inuenced by le 4.exe with SHA2 CB866..., which is benign. For this example, we consider a node as malicious if f i > 0.5. In the end, M is able to ag as malware three previously-unknown samples. As we can see in Figure 4 , the Bayesian label propagation algorithm enables M to ag the rest of the les as malicious. infers probabilistic node labels. Initially, two les are known to be malware and one is known to be benign. At the end of process, three additional les are correctly identi ed as malware.
Scalability
It is important to note that Eq (6) can be easily parallelized due to its recursive update nature. at is, for each individual node i, it outputs its current label con dence f i to its neighbors during the map phase; at the reduce phase, it updates its labeling con dence f i by using a weighted aggregation N j=1 A i, j f j + α then divided by N j=1 A i, j + 1 (which is the sum of all edges incidental to the node i). In terms of time complexity, the proposed method iterates over each edge in the download graph a constant amount of times. Given the maximum number of iterations parameter is xed as c, the graph has |E| edges and |V | node, the overall time complexity is O ((|E| + |V |) * c).
erefore, it is safe for us to conclude that M has a linear time complexity.
DATASETS
To validate and test M we use the download activity data from Symantec's data sharing platform. is data was collected from the users who opt in for Symantec's data sharing program to help improving its detection capabilities. To preserve the anonymity of the users, client identi ers were anonymized so that it is not possible to link back the collected data to the user that originated it.
e download activity data provides meta-information about all download activities on the user clients. From this data we extract the following information: the server side timestamp of the download event, the name, SHA2, and size (in bytes) of the downloaded le, the referrer URL, the landing page URL and IP address of the server the le was downloaded from, the full path at which the downloaded le was stored on the server, the SHA2 of the parent le (the le that initialized the le downloading activity) and the URL that this le was downloaded from. Note that SHA2 and URL of the parent le are not always present and we also remove parent SHA2s related to popular web browsers and le archivers from our dataset, to prevent unrelated les from being connected in the download graph -a similar approach was used in previous work that studied local delivery graphs [19] . In this paper, we remove 710 SHA2s that are relating to Outlook, IExplore, Firefox, Chrome, WinZip, Filezilla, 7Zip, TeamViewer and WinRAR. Symantec also employs extensive static and dynamic analysis systems to determine the maliciousness of a binary. We leverage these results and further enrich our dataset using its binary reputation data to include metadata about the reputation and prevalence of the downloaded les. is allows us to evaluate M 's performance, by looking at its capability of agging known malware and benign so ware. On average we extracted 20 million download events generated by 1.5 million machines per day. We compiled two separate datasets from this download data. e rst one, which we call D 1 , spans a period of 10 days in January 2016, and is composed of over 200 million download events. We use D 1 to tune the parameters needed for M 's operation, and to validate our approach. We then compile another dataset, which we call D 2 . is dataset is composed of 660 million download events collected over the entire month of June 2016. We use this dataset to test M , and to show that our system can still perform accurate detections without needing re-tuning six months a er it was set up. Data Limitations: It is important to note that the download activity data is collected passively. at is, download events are recorded only when their associated downloading request is initiated (this being generated from a user by clicking on a link or stealthily triggered by a drive-by download exploit or a le dropping event). Any downloads preemptively blocked by existing defenses (e.g., URL/IP blacklists) were not observed.
VALIDATION
In this section, we rst describe how we collect the ground truth of malicious and benign les in Section 5.1. We then provide a detailed validation of M over the D 1 dataset (see Section 4) collected in January 2016. We identify the optimum values for several parameters used by M . Once the optimal parameters are identi ed, we validate M 's e ectiveness at detecting malware by comparing its detections with the ground truth labels. We show that M can e ectively increase the knowledge of malware samples delivered over a download graph, requiring limited seeds of known malicious and benign les. In Section 6.1 we show that the system tuned and tested on the dataset D 1 can still detect malware on a dataset collected six months later.
Ground Truth
M requires labeled ground truth of malware and benign so ware for two reasons.
e rst one is that the approach described in Section 3.2 requires a number of seed les to propagate their reputation across the download graph. e second one is that ground truth is needed to check whether the detections performed by M are accurate or not. We used three separate sources to collect ground truth: VirusTotal, the National So ware Reference Library, and data collected by Symantec. VirusTotal. VirusTotal [2] is a free online service that aggregates the scanning outputs of les and URLs from di erent antivirus engines, website scanners, and a number of le and URL characterization tools. We query VirusTotal for each le SHA2 to obtain its rst seen timestamp, the number of AV products (and associated vendor names) that agged the le as malicious, and the total number of AV products that scanned the le. We consider a le malicious if at least one of the top ve AV vendors w.r.t. market share (in no particular order, Symantec, Avast, Microso , AVG, Avira) and a minimum of two other AVs detect it as malicious. A similar technique was used by previous work [24] . National So ware Reference Library (NSRL). To identify known benign and reputable les we used NSRL's Reference Data Set (RDS) version 2.51 [1] . is dataset provides SHA1 to SHA256 hashes for known benign programs and it was useful for us to identify such les in our dataset.
Complementary Ground Truth. We obtained additional ground truth about malicious les from Symantec, which provided us with the data. is ground truth is based on Symantec's static and dynamic binary analysis platform.
In total our ground truth on dataset D 1 consists of 833,705 malicious les and 1,896,782 benign les.
e skewed distribution between benign and malicious les maps the real world observation that benign les are more prevalent in the wild.
Choose Optimal Parameters
M requires three parameters to operate. ese three parameters are the shape parameter of the Dirichlet distribution α, the benign le sampling ratio r b , and the malware sampling ratio r m . Di erent α values a ect the inference accuracy (see Section 3.2), while r b and r m determine the training data size for benign and malicious les respectively. In this section, we explain how we selected the optimal value for these parameters for M to operate.
Since α, r b , r m are not independent, but selecting one of them in uences the values of the others, we did not choose them separately. We adopt the grid search approach [4] to nd the optimal parameters. More precisely, we exhaustively search through a multiple combinations of values for these three parameters and evaluate M by using each of them. We identify the optimal parameters that generate the maximum geometric mean (G-mean) score [25] (G-mean= T P r at e × (1 − F P r at e )). Our dataset is imbalanced between benign and malicious les. is makes G-mean the ideal metric to evaluate the performance of M , because it balances between the classi cation performance on the majority and the minority class.
Guided by this methodology, we form the parameter space by se ing α between (0, 1], r b between [0.4, 0.7] and r m between [0.05, 0.2], and build 64 combinations of these three parameters.
e ranges of r m and r b are selected to re ect the real world scenario; there are plenty of benign les available while the number of malware samples is limited and we also need to leave some portion of samples out for test purpose.
We then use them to carry out the grid search. We run M on a three day subset of the dataset D 1 for each combination, and average the G-mean score over the three days to measure the performance of each combination. We perform strati ed 10-fold cross validation [16] for each combination. Our results show that given α = 0.1, r b = 0.6 and r m = 0.1, M outputs the best average G-mean score, 0.953. On that account, we use these values for the rest of the paper. In the next section we provide detection results using these parameters over the remaining part of dataset D 1 . In Section 6.1 we demonstrate that these parameters are still e ective for M to detect malware six months later.
Time and Memory Performance
Following our theoretical analysis in Section 3.4, we evaluate our system runtime performance to answer key practical questions such as 1) how long does M take to construct a download graph, 2) how long does M take to infer maliciousness of all unlabeled nodes in a download graph and 3) how long does M take to compute the optimal parameters. Since our typical use case is to identify malicious les on any given day, for the rest of the section, we use one day of data with 21,627,935 download events from D 1 as our runtime evaluation baseline. All tests are performed in a server with a 2.67GHz Xeon CPU X5650 and 64GB memory running Ubuntu Linux 12.04 and Python 2.7.3. In this setup, M takes 890.95 seconds to construct the download graph from one day of data with 15.98GB memory footprint. Once the graph is constructed, M takes 84.498 seconds to nish the inference task (see Section 3.2). In other words, M is able to perform its entire analysis for one day in about 16 minutes. is exempli es M 's computational advantage as we theoretically proved in Section 3.4. In terms of how long it takes to tune the parameters required by M to operate, essentially we need to repeat the aforementioned inference task 64 times (see Section 5.2) on a three day subset of the dataset D 1 . M takes therefore 4.82 hours to nd the optimal parameter combination. Note that we don't need to run this tuning task frequently as we demonstrate that M is able to retain similar accuracy over time (see Section 6).
Labeling Performance
We validate the overall performance of M on the labeled data (i.e., ground truth) over a 7 days subset of the D 1 datasetnote that the remaining 3 days for this dataset were used to tune the optimal parameters. In order to assess M 's performance from di erent perspectives, we also include the area under the ROC curve (AUC) score [7] , in addition to the G-mean score that we already used in Section 5.2. Overall, M achieves an average AUC of 0.960 (with a standard deviation of 0.01), and an average G-mean of 0.944 (with a standard deviation of 0.008). is shows that M can o er high accuracy with stable performance over time since the standard deviation of both AUC and G-mean scores over the measurement period of 7 days are small. We further con rm this nding by testing M on a dataset collected six months later in Section 6.1.
We then wanted to understand the true positive rate (TPR) and false positive rate (FPR) reported by M on labeled data. ese values are important, because they give us a feeling of how well M would perform if ran in the wild. Table 1 reports the results of this experiment. We start by se ing a fairly high false positive rate of 3.5%, and measure that in this se ing M has a TPR of 0.923 (which corresponds to a false negative rate of 7.7%) on average. By decreasing the false positive rate, the TPR decreases but remains high. With a FPR of 1%, M reports a TPR of 0.786 (false negative rate of 21.4%) on average. By decreasing the false positive rate even further, to 0.5%, M reports and average TPR of 0.690 (false negative rate of 31%). is result shows that M could be set to have very low false positives and still be useful in practice, agging a signi cant amount of malware. In addition, in Section 6.1 we show that whitelisting can be used to further reduce false positives. We also show that false negatives in the wild are lower than what reported by these validation tests, which were only performed on ground truth of known malicious and benign les. M , regardless the size of the graph, can also maintain comparable accuracy in terms of both AUC and G-mean scores thanks to recursively propagated evidence across the whole graph. Details can be found in Section 5.5.
Modifying the Observation Interval
Our hypothesis is that M , regardless the size of the graph, should maintain comparable accuracy in terms of both AUC and Gmean scores thanks to recursively propagated evidence across the whole graph. To check if this is the case, we build three download graphs from observation periods of one hour (00:00 -01:00), two hours (00:00 -02:00), and three hours (00:00 -03:00), extracted from the data collected on a one day subset of the dataset D 1 . We use the same parameters as in the rest of the paper. We list the results of this experiment in Table 2 and compare the results to those obtained on the data extracted over an entire day. As we can see, even if the graphs for shorter time intervals are signi cantly smaller, both AUC and G-mean scores from all three experiments remain similar to those for the full day data: we have an AUC of 0.975 (G-mean 0.919) for the one-hour interval, an AUC of 0.977 (G-mean 0.923) for the two-hour interval, and an AUC of 0.978 (G-mean 0.957) for the three-hour interval. ese results demonstrate that our approach can work well on di erent observation windows, and underpins M 's real-world practicability. 
EVALUATION
In the previous section we validated M by testing it on ground truth data collected over a period of 10 days (dataset D 1 ). In this section we evaluate it against dataset D 2 , which was collected six months later. We rst show that M is still e ective in detecting malware without need for re-tuning a er this period of time, signi cantly growing the amount of detected malware samples compared to the ones used for seeding. We also show that M is able to detect malware before VirusTotal.
Malware Detection In the Wild
We ran M on the entire 30-day dataset D 2 . On average, we seeded the system with 111,449 benign les and 7,657 malicious ones every day. We used four di erent modes of operation for M , which means that for each of them we set the parameters that reported 3.5%, 2%, 1%, and 0.5% FPR in the ground truth validation from Section 5.4. e overall results for our experiments are reported in Table 3 .
For each of the se ings, we carefully ve ed the results provided by M . In particular, we rst checked whether the detections performed were either con rmed by Symantec's internal systems or if the SHA2 hashes of the detected les appeared as malicious in VirusTotal. We considered these detections as true positives by M . Note that we split detections between malware and PUP, based on Symantec's feedback. As we show in Section 7.4, it is o en di cult to distinguish the two types of operations. As it can be seen in Table 3 , the fraction of detections performed by M is generally high. For the 3.5% se ing we can con rm 94% of the detections as either malware or PUP. is number gradually increases as we make detection stricter, peaking at 98% for the se ings that lead to a 0.5% FPR during the validation phase.
For the false positive analysis, we looked at les whose SHA2s are known as benign by Symantec. As it can be seen in Table 3 , false positives decrease as we make M stricter on which les it considers as malware. For the 3.5% case, M reports a 5.8% false positive rate in the wild. is number decreases steadily as the system becomes stricter, up to arriving at 1.1% for the 0.5% se ing. In general, we can observe that M 's results in the wild are slightly worse than they were by looking at labeled data only (as we did in Section 5.4). As we explained, however, we expect many of these false positives to be systematic and not change signi cantly over time, so that they can be easily removed by using a whitelist. In Section 7.1 we show a detailed example of these systematic false positives. To test this hypothesis, we compile a whitelist of known benign les from January 2016, and apply it to our results obtained six months later, in June. As Table 3 reports, the whitelist is able to reduce false positives signi cantly. For the 3.5% se ing, the false positive rate of the ltered dataset is only 3%, while for the 0.5% se ing it becomes 0.6%. While false positives in the wild turn out to be slightly higher than in the validation phase, false negatives are lower, indicating that M is able to comparatively detect more malware than it was present in our ground truth. As it can be seen in Table 3 , the false negative rate for the 3.5% se ing is 5.5%, while it was 7.6% on the ground truth. Similarly, for the 0.5% case the FNR is 26.2%, while it was 31% during the validation. Finally, for a small number of les none of our sources could con rm whether these les were benign or malicious. We list them as "unknown" in Table 3 .
Based on the results reported in this section, we can see that M is able to e ectively detect malware, and does not require frequent retraining, as the results in the wild six months a er the tuning of the systems are generally in line with the original validation results. Depending on how strict the operator wants to be in making detections, M can increase the original knowledge of malware from the seed les between 11 times (in the 3.5% case) and 6 times (in the 0.5% case). 
Early Detection of Unknown Malware
We estimate that if M was run in production it would have been able to detect these les as malicious before other antivirus programs. To understand how relevant this early detection would have been, we looked at the average days passed between when M agged a le as malicious and when VirusTotal agged it as such too. Note that we consider a malware sample as detected by VirusTotal if it is agged by one of the top ve AV products plus any other two [24] . For evaluation purpose in this section, we set FPR=3.5%. Figure 5 reports a summary of the number of malware samples detected by M that were unknown to VirusTotal at the moment, together with how much later (in days) these les appeared on VirusTotal as malicious. On average, M was able to detect 1,870 les as malware 6.46 days before VirusTotal on a daily basis.
LESSONS LEARNED AND CASE STUDIES
In this section, we provide some interesting case studies that we encountered while operating M . Note that we remove FQDN nodes from all the gures to make them easier to read.
Malicious programs download legitimate libraries.
In this section, we carry out a detailed case study on PUPs dropping both benign DLLs and further PUPs. is is a typical example of the false positives reported by M , and shows that many false positives are systematic. Figure 6 shows part of a download graph built by M , illustrating a typical case that PUPs drop both benign dlls and further PUPs. As we can see in the gure, le AddonsUI.exe with SHA2 5CD12... is identi ed as PUP Bubbledock and dropped two other PUPs, respectively le OneSystemCare.exe with SHA2 B9BEE... (identi ed as PUP OneSystemCare) and le 7d27aa...exe with SHA2 6307C... (identi ed as Adware ConvertAd), and three benign DLLs, respectively le WmiInspector.dll with SHA2 A9347..., nsdialogs.dll with SHA2 1DEC2..., and HttpRequest.dll with SHA2 97CE1.... Even though these DLLs are legitimate (we speculate that they are dropped as part of the dependencies used by le AddonsUI.exe), these three DLLs are wrongly classi ed as malicious due to the overwhelming evidence surrounding them. In this paper, we showed that benign les marked as malicious by M do not change quickly over time, and can therefore be prevented by applying a static blacklist.
Legitimate content delivery networks are
used to deliver malware. 
PUP Bubbledock
OneSystemCare. Figure 7: Case study in which a legitimate content delivery network is used to deliver both benign and malicious les.
of malicious les/PUPs (shown as red blocks in Figure 7 ). For example, iLividSetup-r612-n-bc.exe is identi ed as the Bandoo adware, and update 33.exe is identi ed as PUP DownloadAdmin. When running M , the malicious reputation of these les gets propagated to AppleSoftwareUpdate.msi and iTunes.msi, which end up being wrongly detected as malware. e issue here is that the CDN is both serving benign and malicious content. In Section 8 we discuss how we could deal with this type of false positives to decrease the false positive rate of M .
Malware operation.
In this section, we carry out a detailed malware distribution case study. Figure 8 shows part of a download graph built by M on January 11, 2016. Nodes connected by dash lines are veri ed to be benign sites and nodes connected with solid lines are the focus of our discussion. ere are three IP addresses that belong to three di erent hosting infrastructures, respectively GoDaddy.com, Arvixe and Beyond Hosting. Before running M , les BridgectrlSpl.dll with SHA2 1F771... and 2653992.exe with SHA2 D6D45... were known to belong to the Razy and Diple malware families respectively. All the other les had unknown reputations. A er running M , the rest of the les were identi ed as malicious (shown in Figure 9 ), and were accordingly con rmed by VirusTotal, either on that same day (7456933.exe) or several days later (4393841.exe, 5315672.exe, 5315671.exe and kinnect.dll). It is worth noting that le 7456931.exe with SHA2 A8CF2... remains unknown to VirusTotal at the moment of writing.
e identi ed malware samples belong to four di erent families: (Radamcrypt, Kovter, Zusy, and Kazy). tags used by di erent vendors, remove general words like "trojan, " "backdoor, " "malware, " etc., and choose the most frequent token as the malware family name. Adding the two malware samples that were provided as ground truth, these three sites dropped malware from 6 di erent families during a single day. When we look at the URLs that host the les closely, they share the same URL path pa ern -a simple path '/counter/'. All the les directly hosted by these three URLs also share similar naming pa ern -a le name with 7 digits. is leads us to believe that these sites were part of an exploit kit deployment. We also carried out a case study on PUP operation, which can be found in Appendix A.
Combined malware and PUP operation.
In this section, we study a case that demonstrates that M 's label propagation can enable us to detect PUPs starting from malware labels.
is case study shows that malicious operations in which malware downloads PUP or vice versa exist, although recent research showed that they are rare [17] . Figure 10 shows . We showed that M can e ciently increase the knowledge of malware samples, identifying malware that was not detected by VirusTotal months a er it was observed in the wild. We mainly envision M as a method that security companies can use to improve their internal knowledge of millions of malicious les they collect on a daily basis. e blacklists generated could then be integrated with existing end-user protection programs, such as antivirus tools and browser blacklists [28] . Limitations. Although M is a useful tool for detecting malicious les, it has some limitations. First of all, M relies on an initial set of labeled nodes to infer the probabilistic labels of other unlabeled nodes in the download graph. As we showed, M needs a minimal number of labeled nodes to be e ective, but this could be a problem in some se ings. Another limitation is that M only infers probabilistic labels of unlabeled nodes in the download graph and does not update the labels of seed nodes during the inference process. is is typically not a problem because AV vendors are conservative in the way they assign labels, but it is a limitation to keep in mind. Evasion. M does not make any assumptions on how malicious les are delivered, or on the structure of these malware delivery networks. e only assumption that is made is that cybercriminal are either delivering the same le over di erent servers or are reusing parts of their infrastructure to serve multiple malware samples. is design choice makes M less prone to evasion than previous systems. Assuming M is known to cybercriminals, there are three possible ways that they could try to evade M . ey could try to compartmentalize their infrastructures, and serve a single malware sample with unique SHA2 from each malicious server. Although this could be e ective in evading our system, we argue that it would not make sense for the malware ecosystem in general, as it would make malware delivery much more expensive (due to the need of se ing up a higher number of servers) and it would ultimately break the pay-per-install ecosystem, since these networks would not be able to provide malware samples from multiple customers anymore.
ey could also try to evade M by dropping more benign les together with malicious binaries, causing our system to potentially ag those benign les as malware. Again, even though this could be e ective in evading our system, we argue that this approach would also make malware delivery much more di cult (due to the need of binding a high number of benign les into the payload, leading to increased payload size, etc). As a third and nal option, malware operators could start using CDNs exclusively to deliver their malicious les. While M would nd it di cult to keep track of such les due to the whitelisting process, this would make malware operators more visible to the CDNs themselves, who could track such malicious activity and terminate their accounts.
RELATED WORK
Studying malware delivery networks. In 2011, Caballero et al.
[5] provided the rst large scale measurement of pay-per-install services in the wild. is work con rmed the previous observations that cybercriminals are commonly using other botnets (known as droppers) to deliver their malicious payloads [33, 34] . In 2012, Grier et al.
[8] studied the phenomenon of exploit kits, which are an alternative way to distribute malware. Nelms et al. [24] proposed Webwitness, a system that automatically builds the sequence of events followed by users before downloading a malware sample. More recently, researchers have been studying the ecosystem of potentially unwanted so ware (PUP), which includes toolbars and adware. omas et al.
[37] performed a systematic study of PUP and its prevalence and its distribution through pay-per-install services. Kotzias et al. [17] identify PUP publishers and then study PPI publishers and their involvement in PUP. Leveraging malware delivery networks for malware detection. Invernizzi et al. [11] proposed Nazca, a system to detect malware in large-scale networks. e system builds malware distribution networks using the HTTP tra c data generated when shellcode downloads the actual malware binary and launches it, and uses this graph to gain insights of various malicious activities associated with the graphs and train a decision tree classi er to detect malicious candidates.Nazca reports 70.59% precision and 100% recall. M favors lowering the number of false detections, and reports 93% TPR for 3.5% TPR in similar se ings.
Abu Rajab et al.
[28] proposed CAMP, a content-agnostic malware detection system which utilizes reputation-based detection to protect users. Leveraging aggregated data sources, CAMP predicts the likelihood that this downloaded binary is malicious. CAMP reports a TPR of 70% and a FPR of around 2%. Accepting a similar FPR, M achieves a TPR of over 90%. Rabharinia et al.
[27] presented Mastino, a system that performs classi cation over behavioral characteristics of how malicious les are downloaded by machines on the Internet. Mastino uses domain-speci c features such as characteristics of the URLs that les are downloaded from and characteristics of the les themselves. By using this domainspeci c information, Mastino reaches 95% TPR with 0.5% FPs. As we mentioned, M does not use any contextual information, and as we show this has the advantage that the system is still capable of e ciently detect malware six months a er it was trained. For fairness though, Mastino reaches be er results in the short term. Including the whitelisting e ort, M reports 1.9% FPs for 93% TPR. Nachenberg et al. [23] presented Polonium, a system that builds bipartite graphs of les and machines on which these les are installed and performs belief propagation to detect malware. e pervasiveness of polymorphism and the subsequent di usion of singleton les might limit the e ectiveness of this system in modern malware delivery. Polonium reported a TPR of 84% and a FPR of 1% over 2011 malware data. is is in line with what was obtained with 2016 malware by M during the validation stage.
e closest work to this paper is [19] . e authors reconstructed and analyzed 19 million downloader graphs from 5 million real hosts, then identi ed several strong indicators of malicious activity including growth rate, the diameter, and the Internet access pa erns of downloader graphs. Building on top of these insights, the authors implemented and evaluated a machine learning system using random forest for malware detection, and proved to achieve high true positive rate and low false positive in detecting malware.
is system has the limitation of only taking into account local visibility for single hosts. M , on the other hand, is able to leverage a global view of malware delivery networks.
We showed that M can operate e ectively without any re-tuning even six months a er the parameters were trained. For a high level comparison, [19] reports 98% TPR with 2% FPR with the full feature set, and 81% TPR and 21% FPR with only the features that are related to the local download graph, and therefore do not take domain-speci c information into account. M performs worse than this system compared to the full feature set (88% TPR for 2% FPR during the validation phase) but clearly outperforms it when compared to the graph-only features.
A number of systems aim at detecting malicious hosts based on structural properties of malware delivery networks. Although the goal of M is to detect malicious les, these approaches have similarities with our system in the way they operate. Zhang et al. [41] proposed ARROW, a system to detect drive-by download attacks. e system builds a hostname-IP mapping to identify central servers of malware distribution networks (MDNs), and generates corresponding signatures. ese signatures are later used to detect malicious webpages.
Li et al.
[20] performed a large scale study on the topological relations among hosts in the malicious Web infrastructure. e system constructs hostname-IP clusters (HICs) and builds topological relationship between HICs. Utilizing the observation that there is a higher density of interconnections among malicious infrastructures than in the rest of the web, a variation of page-rank algorithm is employed to detect dedicated malicious hosts. Stokes et al. [32] proposed WebCop, a bo om up approach to detect malware distribution sites. e system uses the nal destination distribution sites as the starting point, and follows the web graph hyperlinks in reverse to identify the higher level landing sites. WebCop further utilizes the identi ed landing sites to detect unknown distribution sites that share a landing site with a known malware distribution site. Stringhini et al. [35] presented SpiderWeb, a system that builds graphs of HTTP redirections used in the delivery of malware, and performs classi cations on these graphs for malware detection. Mekky et al.
[22] expanded on this model, looking not only at automated redirections but also at the links clicked by users. Manadhata et al. [21] presented an approach to perform belief propagation over download graphs to detect malicious hosts. is system is designed to operate over proxy logs for a single organization, while M is designed to operate over the entire Internet. Although M could be extended to detect malicious hosts, in its current implementation it is designed to identify malicious les.
Compared to all these approaches, M is generic as it does not rely to particular network structures and protocols. is is an important advantage, because it makes our approach applicable to se ings di erent than HTTP. M also does not rely on features that are typical of how cybercriminals operate (e.g., their use of Domain Generation Algorithms of Fast Flux), and is therefore resilient to evasion -in fact, we showed that M is still able to e ciently detect malware six months a er the system was tuned.
CONCLUSION
We presented M , a system that is able to detect malicious les by leveraging a global download graph and label propagation with Bayesian con dence. We showed that the global download graph used by M does not signi cantly change over time, and therefore our system can detect malware for over six months without need of being re-tuned. We were able to grow our knowledge of malware samples by up to eleven times compared to the malicious seeds used, and we showed that 36% of our detections do not appear on VirusTotal three months a er they were detected by M . We presented a number of case studies that aim to shed light on malware delivery ecosystems. We hope that these examples will help our community be er understand the idiosyncrasies associated with malware delivery, and devise be er mitigation systems based on these observations. From our end, we showed that building a whitelist of known benign les can be a simple and durable solution to systematic false positives.
